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Abstract
We present the first micro-architectural side-channel at-
tack which runs entirely in the browser. In contrast to
other works in this genre, this attack does not require the
attacker to install any software on the victim’s machine –
to facilitate the attack, the victim needs only to browse
to an untrusted webpage with attacker-controlled con-
tent. This makes the attack model highly scalable and ex-
tremely relevant and practical to today’s web, especially
since most desktop browsers currently accessing the In-
ternet are vulnerable to this attack. Our attack, which is
an extension of the last-level cache attacks of Yarom et
al. [23], allows a remote adversary recover information
belonging to other processes, other users and even other
virtual machines running on the same physical host as
the victim web browser. We describe the fundamentals
behind our attack, evaluate its performance using a high
bandwidth covert channel and finally use it to construct a
system-wide mouse/network activity logger. Defending
against this attack is possible, but the required counter-
measures can exact an impractical cost on other benign
uses of the web browser and of the computer.
1 Introduction
Side channel analysis is a remarkably powerful class of
cryptanalytic attack. It lets attackers extract secret infor-
mation hidden inside a secure device by analyzing the
physical signals (power, radiation, heat, etc.) the de-
vice emits as it performs a secure computation [15]. Al-
legedly used by the intelligence community as early as
World War II, and first discussed in an academic context
by Kocher et al. in 1996 [14], side channel analysis has
been shown to be effective in breaking into myriad real-
world systems, from car immobilizers to high-security
cryptographic coprocessors [8, 18]. A particular kind of
side-channel attack which is relevant to personal com-
puters is the cache attack, which exploits the use of cache
memory as a shared resource between different processes
or users to disclose secret information [17, 11].
While the potency of side-channel attacks is estab-
lished without question, their application to practical sys-
tems is relatively limited. The main limiting factor to
the practicality of side-channel attacks is the problem-
atic attack model they assume: with the exception of
network-based timing attacks, most side-channel attacks
require that the attacker be in close proximity to the vic-
tim. Cache attacks, in particular, typically assume that
the attacker is capable of executing arbitrary binary code
on the victim’s machine. While this assumption holds
for Infrastructure/Platform-as-a-Service (IaaS/PaaS) en-
vironments such as Amazon’s cloud computing platform,
it is less relevant for other settings.
In this report we challenge this limiting security as-
sumption by presenting a successful cache attack which
assumes a far more relaxed and practical attacker model.
In our attacker model, the victim merely has to access a
website owned by the attacker. Despite this minimal at-
tack model, we show how the attacker can still launch an
attack in a practical time frame and extract meaningful
information from the system under attack. Keeping in
tune with this computing setting, we chose to focus our
attacks not on cryptographic key recovery but rather on
tracking user behavior. The attacks described in this
report are therefore highly practical: practical in the as-
sumptions and limitations they cast upon the attacker;
practical in the time they take to run; and practical in
terms of the benefit they deliver to the attacker. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first side-channel at-
tack which can scale effortlessly into millions of targets.
For our attacks we assume that the victim is using a
personal computer powered by a late-model Intel CPU.
We furthermore assume that the user is accessing the web
through a browser with comprehensive HTML5 support.
As we show in Subsection 5.1, this covers a vast majority
of personal computers connected to the Internet. The vic-
tim is coerced to view a webpage containing an attacker-
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controlled element such as an advertisement. The attack
code itself, which we describe in more detail in Section 2,
executes a Javascript-based cache attack, which allows
it to track accesses to the DUT’s last-level cache (LLC)
over time. Since this single cache is shared by all CPU
cores and by all users, processes and protection rings,
this information can provide the attacker with a detailed
knowledge of the user and the system under attack.
1.1 The Memory Architecture of Modern
Intel CPUs
Modern computer systems typically incorporate a high-
speed central processing unit (CPU) and a large amount
of lower-speed random access memory (RAM). To
bridge the performance gap between these two com-
ponents, modern computer systems make use of cache
memory – a type of memory element with a smaller
size but a higher performance, which contains a sub-
set of the RAM which has been recently accessed by
the CPU. The cache memory is typically arranged in a
cache hierarchy, with a series of progressively larger
and slower memory elements being placed in levels be-
tween the CPU and the RAM. Figure 1, taken from
[22], shows the cache hierarchy used by Intel Ivy Bridge
series CPUs, incorporating a small, fast level 1 (L1)
cache, a slightly larger level 2 (L2) cache, and finally a
larger level 3 (L3) cache which is then connected to the
RAM. The current generation of Intel CPUs, code named
Haswell, extends this hierarchy by another level of em-
bedded DRAM (eDRAM), which is not discussed here.
Whenever the CPU wishes to access a memory element,
the memory element is first searched for in the cache hi-
erarchy, saving the lengthy round-trip to the RAM. If the
CPU requires an element which is not currently in the
cache, an event known as a cache miss, one of the ele-
ments currently residing in the cache must be evicted to
make room for this new element.
The Intel cache micro-architecture is inclusive – all el-
ements in the L1 cache must also exist in the L2 and L3
caches. Conversely, if a memory element is evicted from
the L3 cache, it is also immediately evicted from the L2
and L1 cache. It should be noted that the AMD cache
micro-architecture is exclusive, and thus the attacks de-
scribed in this report are not immediately applicable to
that platform.
This report focusses on the level 3 cache, commonly
referred to as the last-level cache (LLC). Due to the
LLC’s relatively large size, it is not efficient to search
its entire contents whenever the CPU accesses the mem-
ory. Instead, the LLC is divided into cache sets, each
covering a fixed subset of the memory space. Each of
these cache sets contains several cache lines. For exam-
ple, the Intel Core i7-3720QM processor, which belongs
to the Haswell family, includes 8192 = 213 cache sets,
each of which can hold 12 lines of 64 = 26 bytes each,
giving a total cache size of 8192x12x64=6MB. When
the CPU needs to check whether a given physical ad-
dress is present in the L3 cache, it calculates which cache
set is responsible for this address, then only checks the
cache lines corresponding to this set. As a consequence,
a cache miss event for a physical address can result in
the eviction of only one of the relatively small amount of
lines sharing its cache set, a fact of which we make great
use in our attack. The method of mapping between 64-bit
physical addresses and 13-bit cache set indices has been
reverse engineered by Hund et al. in 2013 [12]: of the 64
physical address bits, bits 5 to 0 are ignored, bits 16 to
6 are taken directly as the lower 11 bits of the set index,
and bits 63 to 17 are hashed to form the upper 2 bits of
the cache index. The LLC is shared between all cores,
threads, processes, users, and even virtual machines run-
ning on a certain CPU chip, regardless of privilege rings
or other protection similar mechanisms.
Modern personal computers use a virtual memory
mechanism, in which user processes do not typically
have direct knowledge or access to the system’s physi-
cal memory. Instead, these processes are allocated vir-
tual memory pages. When a virtual memory page is
accessed by a currently executing process, the operat-
ing system dynamically associates the page with a page
frame in physical memory. The CPU’s memory manage-
ment unit (MMU) is in charge of mapping between the
virtual memory accesses made by different processes and
accesses to physical memory. The size of pages and page
frames in most Intel processors is typically set to 4KB,
and both pages and page frames are page aligned – the
starting address of each page is a multiple of the page
size. This means that the lower 12 bits of any virtual ad-
dress and its corresponding virtual address are generally
identical, another fact we use in our attack.
1.2 Cache Attacks
The cache attack is the most well-known representative
of the general class of micro-architectural attacks, which
are defined by Aciiï¿œmez in his excellent survey [2] as
attacks which “exploit deeper processor ingredients be-
low the trust architecture boundary” to recover secrets
from various secure systems. Cache attacks make use of
the fact that, regardless of higher-level security mech-
anisms such as sandboxing, virtual memory, privilege
rings, hypervisors etc., both secure and insecure pro-
cesses can interact through their shared use of the cache.
This allows an attacker to craft a “spy” process which
can measure and make inferences about the internal state
of a secure process through their shared use of the cache.
First identified by Hu in 1992 [11] , several results have
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Figure 1: The Intel Ivy Bridge Cache Architecture (taken from [22])
shown how the cache side-channel can be used to recover
AES keys [17, 4], RSA keys [19], and even allow one
virtual machine to compromise another virtual machine
running on the same host [20].
Our attack is modeled after the PRIME+PROBE attack
method, first described by Osvik et al. in [17] in the con-
text of the L1 cache. The attack was later extended by
Yarom et al. in [23] to last-level caches on systems with
large pages enabled, and we extend it in this work to
last-level caches in the more common case of 4K-sized
pages. In general, the PRIME+PROBE attack follows a
four-step pattern. In the first step, the attacker creates
one or more eviction sets. An eviction set is a set of lo-
cations in memory which, when accessed, can take over
a single cache line which is also used by the victim pro-
cess. In the second step, the attacker primes the cache set
by accessing the eviction set. This forces the eviction of
the victim’s code or instructions from the cache set and
brings it to a known state. In the third step, the attacker
triggers or simply waits for the victim to execute and po-
tentially utilize the cache. Finally, the attacker probes
the cache set by accessing the eviction set yet again. A
low access latency suggests that the attacker’s code or
data is still in the cache, while a higher access latency
suggests that the victim’s code made use of the cache
set, thereby teaching the attacker about the victim’s inter-
nal state. The actual timing measurement is carried out
by using the unprivileged assembler instruction rdtsc,
which provides a very sensitive measurement of the pro-
cessor’s cycle count. Iterating over the linked list also
serves a secondary purpose by forcing the cache set yet
again into an attacker-controlled state, thus preparing for
the next round of measurements.
1.3 The Web Runtime Environment
Javascript is a dynamically typed, object-based script-
ing language with runtime evaluation, which powers the
client side of the modern web. Javascript code is deliv-
ered to the browser runtime in source-code form and is
compiled and optimized by the browser using a just-in-
time mechanism. The fierce competition between differ-
ent browser vendors resulted in an intense focus on im-
proving Javascript performance. As a result, Javascript
code performs in some scenarios on a level which is on
par with that of native code.
The core functionality of the Javascript language is
defined by the ECMA industry association in Standard
ECMA-262 [7]. The language standard is complemented
by a large set of application programming interfaces
(APIs) defined by the World Wide Web Consortium [6],
which make the language practical for developing web
content. The Javascript API set is constantly evolving,
and browser vendors add support to new APIs over time
according to their own development schedules. Two spe-
cific APIs which are of use to us in this work are the
Typed Array Specification [9], which allows efficient ac-
cess to unstructured binary data, and the High Resolu-
tion Time API [16], which provides sub-millisecond time
measurements to Javascript programs. As we show in
Subsection 5.1, a large majority of Web browsers in use
today support both of these APIs.
Javascript code runs in a highly sandboxed environ-
ment – code delivered via Javascript has highly restricted
access to the system. For example, Javascript code can-
not open files, even for reading, without the permission
of the user. Javascript code cannot execute native lan-
guage code or load native code libraries. Most signifi-
cantly, Javascript code has no notion of pointers. Thus,
it is impossible to determine even the virtual address of a
Javascript variable.
1.4 Our Contribution
Our objective was to craft a last-level cache attack which
can be deployed over the web. This process is quite
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challenging since Javascript code cannot load shared li-
braries or execute native language programs, and since
Javascript code is forced to make timing measurements
using scripting language function calls instead of using
dedicated assembler instruction calls. These challenges
notwithstanding, we have been able to successfully ex-
tend cache attacks to the web-based environment:
• We present a novel method of creating a non-
canonical eviction set for the last-level cache. In
contrast to [23], our method does not require the
system to be configured for large page support, and
as such can immediately be applied to a wider va-
riety of desktop and server systems. We show that
our method runs in a practical time even when im-
plemented in Javascript.
• We present a fully functional last-level cache at-
tack using unprivileged Javascript code. We eval-
uate its performance using a covert channel method,
both between different processes running on the
same machine and between a VM client and its host.
The nominal capacity of the Javascript-based chan-
nel is on the order of hundreds of kilobits per sec-
ond, comparable to that of the native code approach
of [23].
• We show how cache-based methods can be used to
effectively track the behavior of the user. This ap-
plication of cache attacks is more relevant to our at-
tack model than the cryptanalytic applications often
explored in other works.
• Finally, we describe possible countermeasures to
our attack and discuss their systemwide cost.
Document Structure: In Section 2 we presents the de-
sign and implementation of the different steps of our at-
tack methodology. In Section 3 we present a covert chan-
nel constructed using our attack methodology and evalu-
ate its performance. In Section 4 we investigate the use
of cache-based attacks for tracking user behavior both
inside and outside the browser. Finally, Section 5 con-
cludes the paper with a discussion of countermeasures
and open research challenges.
2 Attack Methodology
As described in the previous section, the four steps in-
volved in a successful PRIME+PROBE attack are: creat-
ing an eviction set for one or more relevant cache sets,
priming the cache set, triggering the victim operation
and finally probing the cache set again. While the actual
priming and probing are pretty straightforward to imple-
ment, finding cache sets which correlate to interesting
system behaviors and creating eviction sets for them is
less trivial. In this Section we describe how each of these
steps was implemented in Javascript.
2.1 Creating an Eviction Set
2.1.1 Design
As stated in [23], the first step of a PRIME+PROBE attack
is to create an eviction set for a certain desired cache set
shared with a victim process. This eviction set consists
of a set of variables which are all mapped by the CPU
into the same cache set. The use of a linked list is meant
to defeat the CPU’s memory prefetching and pipelining
optimizations, as suggested by [20]. We first show how
we create an eviction set for an arbitrary cache set, and
later address the problem of finding which cache set is
shared with the victim.
As discussed in [17], the L1 cache determines the set
assignment for a variable based the lower bits of its vir-
tual address. Since the attacker is assumed to know the
virtual addresses of its own variables, it was thus straight-
forward to create an eviction set in the L1 attack model.
In contrast, set assignments for variables in the LLC are
made by reference to their physical memory address,
which are not generally available to an unprivileged pro-
cess. The authors of [23] partially circumvented this
problem by assuming that the system is operating in large
page mode, in which the lower 21 bits of the physical and
virtual addresses are identical, and by the additional use
of an iterative algorithm to resolve the unknown upper
(slice) bits of the cache set index.
In the attack model we consider, the system is running
in the traditional 4K page mode, where only the lower 12
bits of the physical and virtual addresses are identical. To
our further difficulty, Javascript has no notion of pointers,
so even the virtual addresses of our own variables are
unknown to us.
The mapping of 64-bit physical memory addresses
into 13-bit cache set indices was investigated by Hund
et al. in [12]. They discovered that accessing a contigu-
ous 8MB “eviction buffer” of physical memory will com-
pletely invalidate all cache sets in the L3 cache. While
we could not allocate such an eviction buffer in user-
mode (indeed, the work of [12] was assisted by a kernel-
mode driver), we allocated an 8MB byte array in vir-
tual memory using Javascript (which was assigned by the
operating system into an arbitrary and non-contiguous
set of 4K physical memory pages), and measured the
system-wide effects of iterating over this buffer. We dis-
covered that access latencies to unrelated variables in
memory were slowed down by a noticeable amount when
we accessed them immediately after iterating through
this eviction buffer. We also discovered that the slow-
down effect persisted even if we did not access the entire
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buffer, but rather accessed it in offsets of once per ev-
ery 64 bytes. However, it was not immediately clear how
to map each of the 131K offsets we accessed inside this
eviction buffer into each of the 8192 possible cache sets,
since we did not know the physical memory locations of
the various pages of our buffer.
A naive approach to solving this problem would be to
fix an arbitrary “victim” address in memory, then find
by brute force which set of 12 out of the 131K offsets
share a set with this address. To do so, we could fix some
subset of the 131K offsets, then measure whether the ac-
cess latency to this victim address is increased after it-
erating through these offsets. If the latency increases,
this means the subset contains the 12 addresses sharing
the set with the victim address. If the latency does not
change, then the subset does not contain at least one of
these 12 addresses, allowing the victim address to remain
in the cache. By repeating this process 8192 times, each
time with a different victim address, we would be able to
identify each cache set and create our data structure.
An immediate application of this heuristic would take
an impractically long time to run. Fortunately, the page
frame size of the Intel MMU, as described in Subsection
1.1, could be used to our great advantage. Since virtual
memory is page aligned, the lower 12 bits of each virtual
memory address are identical to the lower 12 bits of each
physical memory address. According to Hund et al., 6 of
these 12 bits are used in uniquely determining the cache
set index. Thus, an offset in our eviction buffer cannot
be the same cache set as all 131K other offsets, but rather
only with the 8K other offsets sharing address bits 12 to
6. In addition, discovering a single cache set can imme-
diately teach us about 63 additional cache sets located
in the same page frame. Joined with the discovery that
Javascript allocates large data buffers along page frame
boundaries, this led to the greedy algorithm described in
Algorithm 1.
By running Algorithm 1 multiple times, we can grad-
ually create eviction sets covering most of the cache, ex-
cept for those parts which are accessed by the Javascript
runtime itself. We note that, in contrast to the eviction
sets created by the algorithm of [23], our eviction set is
non-canonical – since Javascript has no notion of point-
ers, we cannot identify which of the CPU’s cache sets
corresponds to any particular eviction set we discover.
Furthermore, running the algorithm multiple times on the
same system will result in a different mapping each time
it is run. This property stems from the use of traditional
4K pages instead of large 2MB pages, and will hold even
if the eviction sets are created using native code and not
Javascript.
Algorithm 1 Profiling a cache set
Let S be the set of unmapped pages, and address x be an
arbitrary page-aligned address in memory
1. Repeat k times:
(a) Iteratively access all members of S
(b) Measure t1, the time it takes to access x
(c) Select a random page s from S and remove it
(d) Iteratively access all members of S\s
(e) Measure t2, the time it takes to access x
(f) If removing page s caused the memory access
to speed up considerably (i.e., t1− t2 > thres),
then this page is part of the same set as x. Place
it back into S.
(g) If removing page s did not cause memory ac-
cess to speed up considerably, then this ad-
dress is not part of the same set as x.
2. If |S|= 12, return S. Otherwise report failure.
2.1.2 Evaluation
We implemented Algorithm 1 in Javascript and evaluated
it on Intel machines using CPUs from the Ivy Bridge,
Sandy Bridge and Haswell families, running the latest
versions of Safari and Firefox on Mac OS Yosemite and
Ubuntu 14.04 LTS, respectively. The systems were not
configured to use large pages, but instead were running
with the default 4K page size. The code snippet shown
in Listing 1 shows lines 1.d and 1.e of the algorithm, and
demonstrate how we iterate over the linked list and mea-
sure latencies using Javascript. The algorithm requires
some additional steps to run under Chrome and under
Internet Explorer, which we describe in Subsection 5.1.
Figure 2 shows the performance of the profiling algo-
rithm, as evaluated on an Intel i7-3720QM running Fire-
fox 35.0.1 for Mac OS 10.10.2. We were pleased to find
that the algorithm was able to map more than 25% of the
cache in under 30 seconds of operation, and more than
50% of the cache after 1 minute. The algorithm seems
very simple to parallelize, since most of the execution
time is spent on data structure maintenance and only a
minority of it is actually spent in the actual invalidate-
and-measure portion. The entire algorithm fits into less
than 500 lines of Javascript code.
To verify that our algorithm was indeed capable of
identifying cache sets, we designed an experiment that
compares the access latencies for a flushed and an un-
flushed variable. Figure 3 shows two probability distri-
bution functions comparing of the time required to access
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// Invalidate the cache set
var currentEntry = startAddress;
do {
currentEntry =
probeView.getUint32(currentEntry );
} while (currentEntry != startAddress );
// Measure access time
var startTime =
window.performance.now ();
currentEntry =
primeView.getUint32(variableToAccess );
var endTime = window.performance.now();
Listing 1: Javascript code to invalidate a cache set, then
measure access time
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Figure 2: Cumulative performance of the profiling algo-
rithm
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Figure 3: Probability distribution of access times for
flushed vs. un-flushed variable (Haswell CPU)
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Figure 4: Probability distribution of access times for
flushed vs. un-flushed variable (Sandy Bridge CPU)
a variable which has recently been flushed from the cache
using our method (gray line) with the time required to
access a variable which currently resides in the cache set
(black line). The timing measurements were carried out
using Javascript’s high resolution timer, and thus include
the additional delay imposed by the Javascript runtime.
It is clear to see that the two distributions are distinguish-
able, confirming the correct operation of our profiling
method. Figure 4 shows a similar plot captured on an
older-generation Sandy Bridge CPU, which includes 16
entries per cache set.
By selecting a group of cache sets and repeatedly mea-
suring their access latencies over time, the attacker is
provided with a very detailed picture of the real-time ac-
tivity of the cache. We call the visual representation of
6
this image a “memorygram”, since it is looks quite simi-
lar to an audio spectrogram.
A sample memorygram, collected over an idle period
of 400ms, is presented in Figure 5. The X axis corre-
sponds to time, while the Y axis corresponds to different
cache sets. The sample shown has a temporal resolution
of 250µs and monitors total of 128 cache sets. The in-
tensity of each pixel corresponds to the access latency
of this particular cache set at this particular time, with
black representing a low latency, indicating no other pro-
cess accessed this cache set between the previous mea-
surement and this one, and white representing a higher
latency, suggesting that the attacker’s data was evicted
from the cache between this measurement and the previ-
ous one.
Observing this memorygram can provide several im-
mediate insights. First, it is clear to see that despite
the use of Javascript timers instead of machine language
instructions, measurement jitter is quite low active and
inactive sets are clearly differentiated. It is also easy
to notice several vertical line segments in the memo-
rygram, indicating multiple adjacent cache sets which
were all active during the same time period. Since con-
secutive cache sets (within the same page frame) corre-
spond to consecutive addresses in physical memory, we
believe this signal indicates the execution of a function
call which spans more than 64 bytes of assembler in-
structions. Several smaller groups of cache sets are also
accessed together. We theorize that the these smaller
groups correspond to variable accesses. Finally, the
white horizontal line indicates a variable which is con-
stantly accessed during our measurements. This variable
probably belongs to the measurement code or to the un-
derlying Javascript runtime. It is remarkable that such a
wealth of information about the system is available to an
unprivileged webpage!
2.2 Identifying Interesting Regions in the
Cache
The eviction set allows the attacker to monitor the ac-
tivity of arbitrary sets of the cache. Since the eviction
set we receive is non-canonical, the attacker must now
correlate the cache sets he has profiled to data or code
locations belonging to the victim. This learning/classi-
fication problem was addressed earlier by Zhang et al.
in [25] and by Yarom et al. in [23], where various ma-
chine learning methods such as SVM were used to derive
meaning from the output of cache latency measurements.
To effectively carry out the learning step, the attacker
needs to induce the victim to perform an action, then ex-
amine which cache sets were touched by this action, as
formally defined in Algorithm 2.
Finding a function for step (c) of the algorithm was
Algorithm 2 Interesting Regions in the Cache
Let Si be the data structure matched to eviction set i
1. For each set i:
(a) Iteratively access all members of Si to prime
the cache set
(b) Measure the time it takes to iteratively access
all members of Si
(c) Perform an interesting operation
(d) Measure once more the time it takes to itera-
tively access all members of Si
(e) If performing the interesting operation caused
the access time to slow down considerably,
then the operation was associated with cache
set i.
actually quite challenging due to the limited permissions
granted to Javascript code. This can be contrasted with
the ability of Apecechea et al. to trigger a minimal ker-
nel operation by invoking an empty sysenter call [3].
To carry out this step, we had to survey the Javascript
runtime to discover function calls which may trigger in-
teresting behavior, such as file access, network access,
memory allocation, etc. We were also interested in func-
tions which take a relatively short time to run and left
no background “tails” such as garbage collection which
would impact our measurement in step (d). Several such
functions were discovered in a different context by Ho et
al. in [10]. Another approach would be to induce the user
to perform an interesting behavior (such as pressing a key
on his keyboard) on the behalf of the attacker. The learn-
ing process in this case might be structured (where the
attacker knows exactly when the victim operation was
executed), or unstructured (where the attacker can only
assume that relatively busy periods of system activity are
due to victim operations. We make use of both of these
approaches in the attack we present in Section 4.
Since our code will always detect activity caused by
the Javascript runtime, the high performance timer code,
and other components of the web browser which are run-
ning regardless of the call being executed, we actually
called two similar functions and examined the differ-
ence between the activity profile of the two evaluations
to identify relevant cache sets.
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Figure 5: Sample memorygram
3 A Cache-Based Covert Channel in
Javascript
3.1 Motivation
As shown in [23], last-level cache access patterns can be
used to construct a high-bandwidth covert channel and
effectively exfiltrate sensitive information between vir-
tual machines co-resident on the same physical host. In
our particular attack model, in which the attacker is not
in a co-resident virtual machine but rather inside a web-
page, the motivation for a covert channel is different but
still very interesting.
By way of motivation, let us assume that a Security
Agency is tracking the criminal mastermind Bob. Mak-
ing use of a spear phishing campaign, the Agency in-
stalls a piece of software of its own choosing, commonly
referred to as an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT), on
Bob’s personal computer. The APT is designed to log
incriminating information about Bob and send it to the
Agency’s secret servers. Bob is however highly security-
savvy, and is using an operation system which enforces
strict Information Flow Tracking [24]. This operating
system feature prevents the APT from accessing the net-
work after it accesses any file containing private user
data.
Javascript-based cache attacks can immediately be put
to use to allow the Agency to operate in such a scenario,
as long as Bob can be enticed to view a website con-
trolled by the Security Agency. Instead of transmitting
the private user data over the network, the APT will use
the cache side-channel to communicate with the mali-
cious website, without setting off the flow tracking capa-
bilities of the operating system.
This case study is inspired by the “RF retro-reflector”
design attributed to a certain Security Agency, in which a
collection device such as a microphone does not transmit
the collected signal directly, but instead modulates the
collected signal onto an “illuminating signal” sent to it
by an external “collection device”.
3.1.1 Design
The design of our covert channel system was influenced
by two requirements: first, we wanted the transmitter part
to be as simple as possible, and in particular we did not
want it to carry out the eviction set algorithm of Sub-
section 2.1. Second, since the receiver’s eviction set is
non-canonical, it should be as simple as possible for the
receiver to search for the sets onto which the transmitter
was modulating its signal.
To satisfy these requirements, our transmitter/APT
simply allocates a 4K array in its own memory and con-
tinuously modulates the collected data into the pattern
of memory accesses to this array. There are 64 cache
sets covered by this 4K array, allowing the APT to trans-
mit 64 bits per time period. To make sure the memory
accesses are easily located by the receiver, the same ac-
cess pattern is repeated in several additional copies of
the array. Thus, a considerable percentage of the cache
is actually exercised by the transmitter, in contrast to the
method of [23] which assumes a canonical eviction set,
and thus only activates two lines.
The receiver code profiles the system’s physical mem-
ory, then searches for one of the page frames containing
the data modulated by the APT. The data can then be de-
modulated from the memory access pattern and uploaded
back to the server, all without violating the information
flow tracking protections.
3.1.2 Evaluation
Our attacker model assumes that the transmitter part is
written in (relatively fast) native language, while the re-
ceiver part is implemented in Javascript. Thus, we as-
sumed that the limiting factor in the performance of our
system is the sampling speed of the malicious website.
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Figure 6: A host-to-host covert channel
To evaluate the bandwidth of this covert channel, we
wrote a simple program that iterates over memory in a
predetermined pattern (in our case, a bitmap containing
the word “Usenix”). Next, we attempted to search for
this memory access pattern using a Javascript cache at-
tack, then measured the maximum sampling frequency at
which the Javascript code could be run.
Figure 6 shows a memorygram capturing an execu-
tion of this covert channel. The nominal bandwidth of
the covert channel was measured to be approximately
320kbps, a figure which compares well with the 1.2Mbps
bandwidth achieved by the native code cross-VM covert
channel implemented by [23].
Figure 7 shows a similar memorygram where the re-
ceiver code is not running directly on the host, but rather
on a virtual machine (Firefox 34 running on Ubuntu
14.01 inside VMWare Fusion 7.1.0). While the peak
bandwidth of the in this scenario was severely degraded
to approximately 8kbps, the fact that a webpage running
inside a virtual machine is capable of probing the under-
lying hardware is still quite surprising.
4 User Behavior Tracking Through Cache
Attacks
Most works which evaluate cache attacks assume that the
attacker and the victim share a colocated machine inside
a cloud-provider data center. Such a machine is not typ-
ically configured to accept interactive input, and accord-
ingly most works in this field focus on the recovery of
cryptographic keys or other secret state elements, such
as random number generator states [26]. For this work,
we chose to examine how cache attacks can be used to
track the interactive behavior of the user, a threat which
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Figure 7: A host-to-VM covert channel
is more relevant to the attack model we consider. We note
that [20] have already attempted to track keystroke tim-
ing events using coarse-grained measurements of system
load on the L1 cache.
This case study shows how a malicious webpage can
track a user’s activity using a cache attack. In the at-
tack presented below, we assume that the user has loaded
a malicious webpage in a background tab or window,
and is carrying out sensitive operations in another tab,
or even in a completely different application with no In-
ternet connectivity.
We chose to focus on mouse and network activity be-
cause the operating system code that handles them is
non-negligible. Thus, we expected them to have a rel-
atively large cache footprint. They are also easily trig-
gered by content running within the restricted Javascript
security model, as we describe below.
4.1 Design
The structure of both attacks is similar. First, the profil-
ing phase is carried out, allowing the attacker to probe
individual cache sets using Javascript. Next, during a
training phase, the activity to be detected (i.e. network
activity or mouse activity) is triggered, and the cache ac-
tivity is sampled multiple times with a very high tempo-
ral resolution. While the network activity was triggered
directly by the measurement script (by executing a net-
work request), we simply waved the mouse around over
the webpage during the training period 1.
By comparing the cache activity during the idle and
active periods of the training phase, the attacker learns
1In a full attack, the user can be enticed to move the mouse by
having him play a game or fill out a form.
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which cache sets are uniquely active during the relevant
activity and trains a classifier on these cache sets. Finally,
during the classification phase, the attacker monitors the
interesting cache sets over time to learn about the user’s
activity.
We used a basic unstructured training process, assum-
ing that the most intensive operation performed by the
system during the training phase would be the one being
measured. To take advantage of this property, we cal-
culated the Hamming weight of each measurement over
time (equivalent to the count of cache sets which are ac-
tive during a certain time period), then applied a k-means
clustering of these Hamming weights to divide the mea-
surements into several clusters. We then calculated the
mean access latency of each cache set in every cluster,
arriving at a centroid for each cluster. To classify an un-
known measurement vector, we measured the Euclidean
distance between this vector and each of these centroids,
classifying it as the closest one.
In the classification phase, we generated network traf-
fic using the command-line tool wget and moved the
mouse outside of the browser window. To provide
ground truth for the network activity scenario, we con-
currently measured the traffic on the system using tcp-
dump, then mapped the timestamps logged by tcpdump
to the times detected by our classifier. To provide ground
truth for the mouse activity scenario, we wrote a web-
page that timestamps and logs all mouse events, then
moved the mouse over this webpage. We stress that the
mouse-logging webpage was run on a different browser
(Chrome) than the measuring code (Firefox).
4.2 Evaluation
The results of the activity measurement are shown in Fig-
ures 8 and 9. The top part of both figures shows the real-
time activity of a subset of the cache. On the bottom part
of each figure are the classifier outputs, together with the
ground truth which was collected externally. As the Fig-
ures show, our extremely simple classifier was quite ca-
pable of detecting mouse and network activity. The per-
formance of the attack can be improved without a doubt
by using more advanced training and classification tech-
niques. We stress that the mouse activity detector did not
detect network activity, and vice versa.
The classifier’s measurement rate was only 500Hz. As
a result, it could not count individual packets but rather
periods of network activity and inactivity. In contrast,
our mouse detection code actually logged more events
than the ground truth collection code. This is due to the
fact that the Chrome browser throttles mouse events to
web pages down to a rate of approximately 60Hz.
Detecting network activity can be a stepping stone to-
ward a deeper insight of the user’s activity, as famously
Time (ms)
200 400 600 800 1000 1200
Set Activity 
      Classifier 
Ground Truth 
Figure 8: Network activity detection
Time (ms)
200 400 600 800 1000 1200
Set Activity 
      Classifier 
Ground Truth 
Figure 9: Mouse activity detection
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demonstrated by Chen et al. in [5]. In essence, while
Chen et al. assumed a network-level attacker which can
monitor all incoming and outgoing traffic to the victim,
the techniques presented here can enable any malicious
website to monitor the concurrent web activities of its
users. The attack can be bolstered by more indicators,
such as memory allocations (as explored by [13]), DOM
layout events, disk writes and so on.
5 Discussion
This work shows that side-channel attacks have a much
wider reach than previously expected. Instead of being
relevant only for very specific attacker scenarios, the at-
tack proposed here can be mounted against most com-
puters connected to the Internet. The fact that so many
systems are suddenly vulnerable to side-channel attacks
suggests that side-channel resistant algorithms and sys-
tems should be the norm, rather than the exception.
5.1 Prevalence of Vulnerable Systems
Our attack requires a personal computer powered by
an Intel CPU based on the Sandy Bridge, Ivy Bridge,
Haswell or Broadwell micro-architectures. According
to data from IDC, more than 80% of all PCs sold after
2011 satisfy this requirement. We furthermore assume
that the user is using a web browser which supports the
HTML 5 High Resolution Time API and the Typed Ar-
rays specification. Table 1 notes the earliest version at
which these APIs are supported for each of the common
browser brands, as well as the proportion of global In-
ternet traffic coming from vulnerable browser versions,
according to StatCounter GlobalStats measurements as
of January 2015 [1]. As the table shows, more than 80%
of desktop browsers in use today are vulnerable to the
attack we describe.
The effectiveness of our attack depends on being able
to perform precise measurements using the Javascript
High Resolution Time API. While the W3C recommen-
dation of this API [16] specifies that the a high-resolution
timestamp should be “a number of milliseconds accurate
to a thousandth of a millisecond”, the maximum reso-
lution of this value is not specified, and indeed varies
between browser versions and operating systems. In our
testing we discovered, for instance, that the actual reso-
lution of this timestamp for Safari for MacOS was on the
order of nanoseconds, while Internet Explorer for Win-
dows had a 0.8µs resolution. Chrome, on the other hand,
offered a uniform resolution of 1µ on all operating sys-
tems we tested.
Since, as shown in Figure 3, the timing difference be-
tween a single cache hit and a single cache miss is on
the order of 50ns, the profiling and measurement algo-
rithms need to be slightly modified to support systems
with coarser-grained timing resolution. In the profiling
stage, instead of measuring a single cache miss we repeat
the memory access cycle multiple times to amplify the
time difference. For the measurement stage, we cannot
amplify a single cache miss, but we can take advantage
of the fact that code access typically invalidates multiple
consecutive cache sets from the same page frame. As
long as at least 20 out of the 64 cache sets in a single
page frame register a cache miss, our attack is successful
even with microsecond time resolution.
The attack we propose is also easily applied to mo-
bile devices such as smartphones and tablets. It should
be noted that the Android Browser supports High Reso-
lution Time and Typed Arrays starting from version 4.4,
but at the time of writing the most recent version of iOS
Safari (8.1) did not support the High Resolution Time
API.
5.2 Countermeasures
The attacks described in this report are possible because
of a confluence of design and implementation decisions
starting at the micro-architectural level and ending at the
Javascript runtime: The method of mapping a physical
memory address to cache set; the inclusive cache micro-
architecture; Javascript’s high-speed memory access and
high-resolution timer; and finally, Javascript’s permis-
sion model. Mitigation steps can be applied at each of
these junctions, but each will impose a drawback on the
benign uses of the system.
On the micro-architectural level, changes to the way
physical memory addresses are mapped to cache lines
will severely confound our attack, which makes great use
the fact that 6 of the lower 12 bits of the address are
used directly to select a cache set. Similarly, the move
to an exclusive cache micro-architecture, instead of an
inclusive one, will make it impossible for our code to
trivially evict entries from the L1 cache, making mea-
surement much more difficult. These two design de-
cisions, however, were chosen deliberately to make the
CPU more efficient in its design and in its use of cache
memory, and changing them will exact a performance
cost on many other applications. In addition, modify-
ing a CPU’s micro-architecture is far from trivial, and
definitely impossible as an upgrade to already deployed
hardware.
On the Javascript level, it seems that somewhat re-
ducing the resolution of the high-resolution timer will
make this attack more difficult to launch. However, the
high-resolution timer was created to address a real need
of Javascript developers for applications ranging from
music and games to augmented reality and telemedicine.
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Browser brand High Resolution Time Support Typed Arrays Support Worldwide prevalence
Internet Explorer 10 11 11.77%
Safari 8 6 1.86%
Chrome 202 7 50.53%
Firefox 15 4 17.67%
Opera 15 12.1 1.2%
Total – – 83.03%
Table 1: Prevalence of vulnerable desktop browsers, according to [1]
A possible stopgap measure would be to restrict access
to this timer to applications which gain the user’s con-
sent (for example, by displaying a confirmation window)
or the approval of some third party (for example, by be-
ing downloaded from a trusted “app store”).
An interesting approach could be the use of heuristic
profiling to detect and prevent this specific kind of attack.
Just like the abundance of arithmetic and bitwise instruc-
tions was used by Wang et al. to indicate the existence
of cryptographic primitives [21], it can be noted that the
various measurement steps of our attack access memory
in a very particular pattern. Since modern Javascript run-
times already scrutinize the runtime performance of code
as part of their profile-guided optimization mechanisms,
it should be possible for the Javascript runtime to de-
tect profiling-like behavior from executing code and then
modify its response accordingly (for example by jitter-
ing the high-resolution timer, dynamically moving arrays
around in memory, etc).
5.3 Conclusion
In this report, we showed how the micro-architectural
side-channel attack, which is already recognized as
an extremely potent attack method, can be effectively
launched from an untrusted web page. Instead of the
traditional cryptanalytic application of the cache attack,
we instead showed how user behavior can be effectively
tracked using this method. The potential reach of side-
channel attacks has been extended, meaning that addi-
tional classes of secure systems must be designed with
side-channel countermeasures in mind.
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